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Abstract  
 
To advance understanding of the reasons for informal sector entrepreneurship, this paper 
evaluates the determinants of cross-country variations in the extent to which enterprises are 
unregistered when they start operating. Reporting World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data 
on 67,515 enterprises across 142 countries, the finding is that one in five (19.9 per cent) of the 
formal enterprises surveyed started-up unregistered, although this varies from all enterprises 
surveyed in some countries (e.g., Pakistan) to 1 per cent of surveyed enterprises in Slovakia. 
To explain these cross-country variations, four competing theories are evaluated which 
variously assert that nonregistration is determined by either: economic under-development and 
poorer quality governance (modernisation theory); too much state interference (neo-liberal 
theory); too little state intervention (political economy theory), or an incongruence between the 
laws and rules of formal institutions and the beliefs, values and norms of informal institutions 
(institutional theory). A multilevel probit regression analysis confirms the modernisation, 
political economy and institutional theories, but not neo-liberal theory. Beyond economic 
under-development, therefore, nonregistration is associated with too little state intervention and 
the rules of formal institutions being incongruent with the socially shared beliefs of 
entrepreneurs. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications of 
these findings.  
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; informal economy; shadow economy; economic development; 
development economics; developing economies 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past decade or so, a growing literature has begun to study entrepreneurs who start-up 
their business ventures on an unregistered basis (Perry and Maloney, 2007; Thai and Turkina, 
2014; Williams et al., 2017). This scholarship has revealed that informal sector 
entrepreneurship, defined here as starting-up a venture on an unregistered basis, is not some 
minor feature existing in a few peripheral enclaves of the global economy. Rather, some two-
thirds of all enterprises are estimated to start-up unregistered (Autio and Fu, 2015), and at least 
half of all enterprises globally are unregistered (Acs et al., 2013). The indications nevertheless 
are that significant cross-country variations exist in the extent to which enterprises start-up 
unregistered (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams, 2014b).     
Why, therefore, are enterprises more likely to start-up unregistered in some countries 
than others? To answer this, the aim of this paper is to evaluate determinants of cross-country 
variations in the extent of nonregistration at start-up. These determinants are derived from four 
competing theoretical perspectives. Firstly, modernisation theory asserts that nonregistration is 
greater where there is economic under-development and a lack of modern governance (La Porta 
and Schleifer, 2008, 2014), Secondly, neo-liberal theory argues that the level of nonregistration 
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is greater where there is too much state interference (De Soto, 2001). Thirdly, and conversely, 
political economy theory views new venture nonregistration as higher when there is too little 
state intervention (Castells and Portes, 1989), and fourth and finally, institutional theory views 
registration at start-up as lower the laws and regulations of formal institutions are incongruent 
with the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions (Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014; 
Williams, 2018).  
The intention is to advance understanding of informal sector entrepreneurship in three 
ways. Theoretically, by evaluating the determinants of cross-country variations in the extent to 
which enterprises start-up unregistered, the intention is to reveal that these are not mutually 
exclusive theories but rather, are necessary but insufficient perspectives that can be synthesised 
to produce a more holistic explanation. Empirically, meanwhile, this paper provides a first 
multi-level regression analysis of the firm- and country-level determinants of the varying extent 
to which enterprises start-up unregistered. Third and finally, and from a policy perspective, this 
paper reveals the need for a different policy approach towards nonregistration at start-up than 
is currently used. 
To commence, therefore, the next section provides a theoretical framing by reviewing 
what is known about cross-country variations in the level of nonregistration of business start-
ups, and the various competing theories that seek to explain these cross-country variations. The 
outcome will be a set of hypotheses that can be tested. The third section then reports the data, 
variables and methods used to test these hypotheses, namely a multi-level probit regression 
analysis of the 67,515 enterprises interviewed in the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) 
across 142 countries between 2006 and 2014. The fourth section then reports the findings 
regarding the validity of the various theorisations, followed in the fifth and final section by a 
discussion of the theoretical and policy implications along with the limitations of the study and 
the future research required.  
 
Cross-country variations in business nonregistration at start-up: competing theories 
 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a burgeoning literature on informal sector 
entrepreneurship (Bureau and Fendt, 2011; Ram et al., 2017; Webb et al., 2009, 2013; 
Williams, 2008, 2018). Although informal sector entrepreneurship can be widely defined as 
starting-up and/or owning and managing a business venture which does not register with and/or 
declare some or all of its production and/or sales to the authorities for tax, benefit and/or labour 
law purposes when it should do so (Williams et al., 2017), this paper reflects much current 
scholarship by confining analysis to those starting-up a venture on an unregistered basis 
(Ketchen et al., 2014; Siqueira et al, 2016; Thai and Turkina, 2014). This scholarship has until 
now sought to understand not only the socio-economic characteristics of the entrepreneurs and 
firm types that start-up unregistered (Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 
2014) and whether their motives are necessity- and/or opportunity-driven (Maloney, 2004; 
Perry and Maloney, 2007), but also the extent to which enterprises start-up unregistered (Autio 
and Fu, 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Siqueira et al., 2016). Firstly, therefore, the 
literature is here reviewed on the level of non-registration at start-up and secondly, the previous 
literature seeking to explain the cross-country variations in the level of registration at start-up. 
 
Prevalence of starting-up unregistered 
 
Numerous studies have evaluated in individual countries the extent to which businesses are 
registered when they commence operations (e.g., Godfrey and Dyer, 2015; London et al., 2014; 
Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014; Williams et al., 2016; Yu and Bruton, 2015). However, a 
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more limited number have evaluated cross-country variations in the extent to which enterprises 
start-up unregistered. 
Using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data on 51 countries, Dau and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2014) find that 3.37 informal enterprises are created annually for every 100 people, 
whilst Autio and Fu (2015), also using GEM data and a similar measure, find that two-thirds 
of enterprises start-up unregistered. Moreover, this proportion is the same in OECD countries 
(where 0.62 informal enterprises compared with 0.43 formal enterprises are annually created 
for every 100 people) as in emerging and transition economies (where 0.62 informal enterprises 
compared with 0.37 formal enterprises are created annually for every 100 people). To derive 
these GEM estimates, both studies subtract World Bank estimates of the number of registered 
businesses from the GEM estimates of the total number of new enterprises in each country to 
produce these figures on the proportion of unregistered start-ups. This, however, can be only a 
very tentative estimate.  
One of the few other sources of cross-country data on this issue is the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (WBES) which collects data on whether formal businesses started-up 
unregistered, and whether they compete with the informal sector, Although this WBES dataset 
has been used to analyse the impacts of starting-up unregistered on future firm performance 
(Williams et al., 2017) and whether formal enterprises compete with the informal sector (e.g., 
Hudson et al., 2012), it has not been used until now to analyse cross-country variations in the 
extent to which formal enterprises start-up unregistered and/or the reasons for the cross-country 
variations. To begin to address this, therefore, the different explanations for the cross-country 
variations in the level of registration at start-up are here reviewed so that hypotheses can be 
formulated which can be tested.  
 
Theorising cross-country variations in the level of registration at start-up 
 
To identify explanations for cross-country variations in the scale of business nonregistration at 
start-up, the wider literature explaining cross-country variations in the scale of the informal 
sector can be drawn upon (Williams, 2014a; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). On this 
wider topic, four competing theoretical perspectives exist which argue that the level of 
informality is determined by either: economic under-development and poorer quality 
governance (modernisation theory); too much state interference (neo-liberal theory); too little 
state intervention (political economy theory), or an incongruence between the laws and rules 
of formal institutions and the beliefs, values and norms of informal institutions (institutional 
theory).  
Until now, most studies have adopted the singular logic of one or other of these theories. 
For example, La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 2014) use modernisation theory, De Soto (1989) 
adopts neo-liberal theory, Castells and Portes (1989) and Slavnic (2010) the logic of political 
economy theory, and Webb et al. (2009) institutional theory. However, recent studies have 
questioned whether these theories are mutually exclusive. Analysing bivariate correlations of 
the relationship between the scale of the informal sector and the determinants in each theory, 
across the European Union (Williams, 2014a), Central and Eastern Europe (Williams, 2015a), 
Latin America (Williams and Youssef, 2013) and the wider developing world (Williams, 
2015b), the modernisation, political economy and institutional theories have been confirmed, 
but not neo-liberal theory. This is also the case in multivariate analyses of the scale of the 
informal sector across Central and Eastern Europe (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a) and South-
East Europe (Williams and Horodnic, 2015b). 
When studies have tested these theories as explanations for cross-country variations in 
the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship using simple bivariate correlations, the same 
finding is identified (Williams, 2014b,c). However, there have been few multivariate regression 
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analyses testing these theories as explanations for cross-country variations in informal 
entrepreneurship, and those conducted are narrow in scope. One evaluation examines whether 
these theories explain cross-country variations in informal entrepreneurship by the extent to 
which small business owners under-report the wages of their employees in the 28 countries of 
the European Union (Williams and Horodnic, 2016) and another the extent to which the self-
employed in European Union countries conduct some of their transactions off-the-books 
(Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). Both studies confirm the validity of the modernization, 
political economy and institutional perspectives but not neo-liberal theory.  
Until now, however, there have been no evaluations of these theories for explaining 
cross-country variations in the extent to which businesses start-up unregistered. To fill this gap, 
each theoretical perspective is here reviewed in turn to formulate hypotheses which can be 
tested. 
  Modernisation theory, which dominated the study of informality during the twentieth 
century, asserts that the modern formal sector is extensive and growing whilst the informal 
sector is disappearing. Informal entrepreneurs, such as street vendors, are thus portrayed as a 
residue of a pre-modern production system. Their presence in a country is a sign of the µunder-
development¶ of its economy and a lack of modernisation of its system of governance (Geertz, 
1963; Lewis, 1959). When explaining the cross-country variations in the proportion of 
businesses unregistered at start-up, therefore, it can be suggested that this will be higher in less 
economically developed countries, measured in terms of GDP per capita, and in countries with 
less modern state bureaucracies, measured by the pervasiveness of public sector corruption 
(Tonoyan et al., 2010). The following hypothesis can be therefore tested: 
 
Modernisation hypothesis (H1): the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-
up will be greater in less developed economies with unmodern state bureaucracies. 
H1a: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in less 
developed economies measured in terms of GDP per capita. 
H1b: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in 
countries with less modern state bureaucracies, measured in terms of the level of public 
sector corruption 
 
For neo-liberal theory, meanwhile, too much state interference in the free market leads 
entrepreneurs to make a rational economic decision to exit the formal sector due to the time, 
costs and efforts of conforming to the bureaucratic burdens imposed on enterprises (e.g., De 
Soto, 1989, 2001; London and Hart, 2004). For neo-liberal theory, nonregistration is thus a 
rational economic decision of entrepreneurs who confront burdensome laws and regulations by 
a stifling state bureaucracy (Becker, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007). Nonregistration is a 
result of over-regulation, high taxes and too much state interference and the solutions are 
deregulation, tax reductions, and minimal state interference. The level of nonregistration at 
start-up will be more prevalent in countries with higher tax levels and greater state interference. 
To explore the validity of this neo-liberal theory, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up 
will be greater in countries with higher tax rates, and higher levels of state interference 
in the free market. 
H2a: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in 
countries with higher tax rates, measured by the tax revenue to GDP ratio. 
H2c: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in 
countries where the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is higher. 
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For political economy theory, conversely, nonregistration at start-up is an outcome of a de-
regulated open world economy where outsourcing and subcontracting to informal enterprises 
has become a principle means of reducing costs in contemporary capitalism (Aliyev, 2015; 
Meagher, 2010). From this perspective, enterprises operating unregistered reflect the shift 
towards unregulated production and the advent of precarious low paid survival-driven 
endeavour for those excluded from the formal economy (Castells and Portes, 1989; Dibben et 
al., 2015). Unregistered enterprises and informal entrepreneurship are the outcome of too little 
state intervention in not only the economy but also social protection and social transfer systems. 
The level of nonregistration at start-up is viewed as more prevalent in countries with too little 
state intervention to protect workers and citizens (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Slavnic, 2010). 
To evaluate this, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Political economy hypothesis (H3): the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at 
start-up will be greater in countries with lower levels of state intervention. 
H3a: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in 
countries with lower tax to GDP ratios. 
H3b: the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up will be greater in 
countries where the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is lower. 
 
For institutional theorists, a problem with all the above theories is that they do not explain why 
some entrepreneurs¶ start-up unregistered in a country and others do not; they do not take 
agency into account. Institutional theory, however, has started to overcome this problem 
(Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Denzau and North 1994; North, 1990). In this perspective, 
institutions are the rules of the game which govern and prescribe behaviour, and all societies 
have both formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) that are the legal rules of the game, 
and informal institutions which are socially shared norms, values and beliefs about what is right 
and acceptable (Denzau and North, 1994; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Formal 
entrepreneurship is thus endeavour conforming to formal institutional prescriptions (i.e., the 
laws and regulations), informal entrepreneurship sits outside the formal rules of the game but 
within the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions (Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et 
al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009; Welter et al., 2015; Williams and Vorley, 2015) whilst criminal 
entrepreneurship sits outside both the formal and informal rules of the game (Bunei et al., 2016; 
McElwee and Smith, 2014; Smith and McElwee, 2015; Smith et al., 2017). Viewed through 
this institutionalist lens, cross-country variations in the level of nonregistration at start-up result 
from the incongruence between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the values, 
beliefs and norms of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2015; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al, 
2016; Sutter et al., 2017; Vu, 2014; Webb and Ireland, 2015; Webb et al., 2013, 2014; Williams 
et al., 2017). The belief is that the greater the degree of incongruence, the higher is the level of 
nonregistration at start-up (Williams and Shahid, 2016). To evaluate this institutional theory, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Institutional hypothesis (H4): the greater the incongruence between formal and informal 
institutions, the greater is the likelihood of businesses being unregistered at start-up 
competition. 
 
Data, variables and methods 
 
Data 
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To test these determinants of cross-country variations in the extent to which enterprises start-
up unregistered, World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data collected from 67,515 enterprises 
across 142 countries between 2006 and 2014 is analysed, including 15 developed countries and 
127 developing countries (of which 41 are in Africa, 31 in Latin America and Caribbean, 29 in 
Europe and Central Asia, 13 in East Asia and the Pacific region, 7 in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and 6 in South Asia). Of the countries covered in this survey, 20 high-income, 4 upper 
middle-income, 36 middle-income, 42 lower middle-income and 25 are low-income countries. 
All global regions and economic development levels are therefore covered.  
To collect data in each country, the WBES uses a stratified random sample of non-
agricultural formal private sector businesses with five or more employees. The sample is 
stratified by firm size, business sector and geographic region. The WBES strata for firm size 
are 5-19 (small), 20-99 (medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms). The strata for 
sectors, meanwhile, are manufacturing, services, transportation and construction. In larger 
countries with bigger samples, the strata for manufacturing is again sub-divided based on 
number of jobs, value-added, and total number of establishments. Businesses involved in 
health care, public utilities, financial services and government services are excluded from the 
WBES sample. Finally, the strata for geographical regions are based on cities and regions based 
on their level of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of eligible 
firms which are usually obtained from either the FRXQWU\¶V VWDWLVWLFDO RIILFH RU some other 
government agency such as the tax or business licensing authorities. Since 2006, all national 
surveys explain the source of the sample frame. 
A harmonized questionnaire is also used in all countries reported here, which is 
answered by 1200-1800 business owners and top managers in larger countries, 360 in medium-
sized countries and 150 in smaller countries. Even though the WBES has been conducted since 
2002, the country surveys reported here are restricted to the 142 countries who since 2006 have 
employed both the harmonised questionnaire and the above stratified sampling method. This 
assures that the data reported is comparable across countries and over time.  
 
Dependent variable   
 
To measure the proportion of non-agricultural formal private sector businesses with five or 
more employees that started up unregistered in each country, the responses to the following 
WBES question is used, µWas this establishment formally registered when it began 
operations?¶. This is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the firms declare that they 
started operations in the country without formal registration and a value of 0 when the firm was 
formally registered at the outset of operations.  
 
Key independent variables  
 
To test the theories explaining cross-country variations in the level of registration at start-up, 
variables are used that capture the tenets of the modernisation, neo-liberal, political economy 
and institutional perspectives. To evaluate the economic development tenet of the 
modernisation hypothesis (H1a), the indicator used is: 
x the current GDP per capita of each country expressed as the purchasing power parity in 
international dollars transformed into natural logs. This was retrieved from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database for the relevant years for each country surveyed.   
To evaluate the modernisation of governance hypothesis (H1b) meanwhile, a composite index 
is used which evaluates the corruption behaviors collected in the WBES, namely:   
x Corruption composite index: a dummy variable which indicates whether the entrepreneur 
KDV SDLG SXEOLF RIILFLDOV EULEHV DQG RWKHU SD\PHQWV WR µJHW WKLQJV JRQH¶ LQ UHODWLRQ WR
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customs, taxes, licenses, permits, regulations and services. This is a dummy variable, with 
value 1 if a firm had paid officials in one or more of such cases and value 0 otherwise.  
Meanwhile, to test both the tenets of the neo-liberal thesis (H2) that state interference increases 
the level of nonregistration at start-up and the inverse political economy thesis that state 
intervention reduces the level of nonregistration at start-up (H3), two indicators of the level of 
state intervention are employed, namely:   
x Tax revenue to GDP ratio, from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
x Expense of government as a % of GDP, which is a measure of the size of government and 
therefore a loose proxy of the degree of intervention. The expense of government is the 
level of cash payments for the operating activities of the government in providing goods 
and services. It includes compensation of employees (such as wages and salaries), interest 
and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends (World 
Bank, 2017). 
To test the institutional hypothesis (H4), meanwhile, the indicator used is:  
x Trust in the court system, measured by the percentage of firms believing that the court 
system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted. This is based on the response to the following 
question: µI am going to read some statements that describe the courts system and how it 
could affect business. For each statement, please tell me if you strongly disagree, tend to 
disagree, tend to agree, or strongly agree¶. This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 given 
WR WKRVH ILUPVZKRDJUHHDQGVWURQJO\DJUHH WKDW µWKHFRXUW V\VWHPLV IDLU LPSDUWLDO DQG
XQFRUUXSWHG¶DQGDYDOXHRIIRUWKRVHZKRGLVDJUHHRUVWURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
This variable of trust in the court system is here used a proxy indicator of the level of trust of 
entrepreneurs in the formal institutions, and thus a measure of the degree of incongruence 
between the formal and informal institutions (i.e., the extent to which entrepreneurs have faith 
in the court system).   
 
Other control variables 
 
To control for other key explanatory variables that may also affect nonregistration at start-up, 
a series of individual-level variables are included that are revealed to influence the likelihood 
of informal entrepreneurship both in previous analyses of the WBES data (Hudson et al., 2012; 
Williams et al., 2017) and other studies of informal entrepreneurship (Dau and Cuervo-
Cazzurra, 2014; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Vu, 2014). These firm-level control variables are: 
x Firm age: a continuous variable for the number of years since the firm was established. 
x Foreign-owned: D GXPP\ YDULDEOH ZLWK YDOXH  LQGLFDWLQJ LI WKH VKDUH RI WKH ILUP¶V
ownership held by foreign individuals or enterprises is larger than 49 per cent. 
x Export-orientation: DGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKYDOXHLQGLFDWLQJWKHSURSRUWLRQRIILUP¶VVDOHV
which are for the export market and 0 for the share of sales for the domestic market. 
x Firm size: a categorical variable with value with value 1 for small firms with less than 20 
employees, value 2 for medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees, and value 3 for 
large firms with more than 100 employees. 
x Legal status: a categorical variable indicating whether the legal form of the firm is an open 
shareholding, a closed shareholding, a sole proprietorship (i.e., ownership), a partnership, 
a limited partnership, or any other form. 
x Quality certification, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has an 
internationally-recognized certification and 0 otherwise;  
x External auditor, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has its annual financial 
statement reviewed by an external auditor and 0 otherwise; 
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x Presence of a website, a dummy variable with value 1 when the firm uses a website for 
business related activities and 0 otherwise, and  
x Use of e-mail, a dummy variable with value 1 when a firm uses e-mail to interact with 
clients and suppliers and 0 otherwise.  
x 7RS PDQDJHU¶V H[SHULHQFH, a continuous variable of the years of experience the top 
manager has in the sector;  
x Temporary workers, a variable measuring the average number of temporary workers in the 
firm;  
x Permanent full-time workers, a continuous variable of the average number of permanent 
full-time workers in the firm;  
x Female full-time workers, examining the share of permanent full-time workers that are 
female; and 
x Female involvement in ownership, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating whether 
women are involved in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise;  
Methods 
To evaluate the country-level determinants of whether formal firms are more likely to state that 
they started-up unregistered across the 142 countries, multilevel techniques are used. Given 
that the surveyed enterprises in the WBES are clustered across country-year subsamples, 
multilevel modelling is the optimal technique to elicit unbiased standard errors as well as 
reliable statistical comparisons. The estimating standard probit equation takes the following 
form: 
iii xI 11
'
1 HE  
 
where ix1 denotes a vector of exogenous variables capturing firm-level characteristics and iI
represents whether formal firms are unregistered at start-up. The error term i1H  is normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance.  
 
Findings: determinants of cross-country variations in nonregistration at start-up 
 
One in five (19.9 per cent) formal enterprises surveyed in these 142 countries report that they 
started-up unregistered. A significant minority of the current formal business community 
worldwide, therefore, started unregistered and made a transition to legitimacy. Nevertheless, 
the proportion of formal enterprises that started-up unregistered varies across global regions. 
As Table 1 reveals, the share of formal enterprises that were unregistered at start-up ranges 
from 46.9 per cent in South Asia and 43.2 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa to 7.9 per cent in 
OECD nations and 5.5 per cent in Europe and Central Asia.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are also significant cross-country variations in the extent to which formal enterprises 
started-up unregistered ranging from all enterprises surveyed in Burundi, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Swaziland, 74 per cent in Angola and 63 per 
cent in Uganda, to only 3 per cent in Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, 
Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Panama, Poland, St Lucia, Venezuela, to 2 per 
cent in Armenia, Bhutan, Croatia, Romania, Suriname and Slovakia, and just 1 per cent in 
Slovenia. 
How, therefore, can such cross-country variations be explained? Are cross-country 
variations in nonregistration at start-up associated with the level of economic development and 
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the modernisation of governance as modernisation states? Are they associated with too much 
or too little state intervention as the neo-liberal and political economy theories state 
respectively? And are they associated with the level of incongruence between formal and 
informal institutions?  
Table 2 reports the standard probit coefficient estimates of the likelihood of a formal 
business starting-up unregistered across the 142 countries. Model 1 reports the probability of 
an enterprise staring-up unregistered using only the firm-level variables. This reveals that older 
firms being more likely to have started-up unregistered. Meanwhile, firms that export and are 
foreign-owned are significantly less likely to have started-up unregistered than non-exporting 
and domestic-owned enterprises. Turning to workfoUFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWRSPDQDJHU¶VZRUNLQJ
experience in the sector is not significantly associated. Firms with full time permanent and 
female workers, nevertheless, are significantly less likely to have started-up unregistered, as 
are firms where women are involved in the ownership of the enterprise. Examining innovation 
and technology, furthermore, formal firms with quality certification, a website, email and 
external auditor are less likely to have started-up unregistered. Akin to previous studies 
(Kanbur, 2015), small firms are significantly more likely to have started-up unregistered than 
medium-sized and larger enterprises. And finally, and with respect to the legal status of firms, 
sole proprietors are significantly more likely to have started-up unregistered, but closed 
partnerships are significantly less likely to have done so.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To evaluate the different explanations for the cross-national variations in nonregistration at 
start-up, model 2 then adds the first country-level indicator of the log of GDP per capita and 
shows a significant negative association. This confirms the first tenet of the modernisation 
thesis (H1a), namely that the higher the GDP per capita, the lower is the probability that formal 
enterprises started-up unregistered. Importantly, moreover, the significances and signs of 
nearly all the first-level variables in model 1 remain the same when this country-level variable 
is added in model 2. The remaining models then include each of the country-level variables 
associated with each tenet of the remaining theoretical explanations in a sequential manner to 
evaluate whether they are significantly associated with cross-country variations in 
nonregistration at start-up, whilst holding constant the firm-level variables.    
To analyse the second tenet of the modernisation thesis regarding whether the quality 
of governance, measured here in terms of the level of corruption, is significantly associated 
with the likelihood of formal enterprises starting-up unregistered, model 3 finds a positive 
association. The higher is the level of corruption, the higher is the likelihood that formal 
enterprises started-up unregistered (confirming H1b).  
Turning to the neo-liberal thesis (H2), the first tenet to analyse is whether the level of 
nonregistration at start-up is greater in countries with higher taxation, measured by the tax 
revenue to GDP ratio. Contrary to neo-liberal theory that higher taxation results in higher levels 
of non-registration at start-up, model 4 reveals the opposite. The higher is the level of tax 
revenue to GDP ratio, the less likely are formal enterprises to be unregistered at start-up. This 
refutes H2a and is supportive of the political economy view that the greater the level of state 
intervention, measured here by the tax revenue to GDP ratio, the less likely are formal 
enterprises to be unregistered at the commencement of operations (confirming H3a). 
It is similarly the case when hypothesis H2b is tested, namely that the level of 
nonregistration at start-up is greater in countries higher levels of state interference in the free 
market, measured by the expense of government as a percentage of GDP. Model 5 reveals that 
there is a statistically significant association, but the sign is in the opposite direction to the neo-
liberal thesis. The greater is the expense of government (as a percentage of GDP), the less likely 
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are formal enterprises to start-up unregistered (refuting H2b). This, therefore, is supportive of 
political economy theory; the greater the expense of government as a percentage of GDP, the 
less likely are formal enterprises to be unregistered at start-up (confirming H3b).  
Turning finally to whether there is strong significant negative association between an 
incongruence between the formal and informal institutions (measured by whether the court 
system is viewed as fair, impartial and uncorrupted) and the likelihood of formal enterprises 
starting-up unregistered, the finding is that the greater is the level of incongruence, the greater 
is the probability that formal enterprises will start-up unregistered (confirming H4). This 
remains valid across all models. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Evaluating WBES data from 142 countries collected between 2006 and 2014 on cross-country 
variations in the level of nonregistration at start-up, the finding is that one in five formal 
enterprises were unregistered at start-up, although there are marked cross-country variations in 
the proportion of formal enterprises that started-up unregistered. Evaluating the determinants 
of the cross-country variations in the level of nonregistration at start-up, a multivariate probit 
regression analysis has confirmed the modernization, political economy and institutional 
theories, but not neo-liberal theory. Here, therefore, the theoretical and policy implications are 
discussed.  
 Theoretically, this study reveals the importance of transcending singular logics when 
explaining cross-country variations in the level of nonregistration at start-up. Not all these 
theories are mutually exclusive. Understanding the cross-national variations in informal 
entrepreneurship require the modernization, political economy and institutional theories to be 
combined. They are each necessary but insufficient perspectives that need to be synthesised. 
This new theory that synthesises these previous theoretical perspectives is here termed µQHR-
LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWPRGHUQL]DWLRQ¶WKHRU\. Reflecting the above findings, this theory asserts that the 
level of nonregistration at start-up is higher in countries where there is a lower level of 
economic development, lower quality of governance, lower levels of state intervention and 
higher levels of institutional incongruence.   
 These findings of this study not only have implications for theory. They also have 
implications for how starting-up unregistered is tackled. Conventionally, the dominant policy 
approach has been for tax and labour inspectorates to pursue the eradication of unregistered 
enterprises by changing the cost/benefit ratio confronting entrepreneurs at start-up to make 
registration a rational economic decision. This has been predominantly achieved by raising the 
perceived and/or actual risks of detection and the level of fines for nonregistration (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972). Recent years, nevertheless, has seen more emphasis on making it easier, 
beneficial and less burdensome to register (Williams et al., 2017), due to a recognition that the 
policy objective should not be to shut unregistered enterprises but rather, to formalise enterprise 
in the informal sector (ILO, 2014). The finding in this paper that one in five formal enterprises 
started-up unregistered provides evidence that shutting unregistered enterprise is deleterious to 
economic development and that formalising informal enterprise is a more progressive 
approach.   
 However, changing the cost/benefit ratio confronting entrepreneurs does not deal with 
the structural causes of the level of nonregistration at start-up. It simply seeks to cure the 
problem, rather than prevent it from happening. To do this, governments need to tackle the 
structural causes. The likelihood of enterprises starting-up unregistered is significantly higher 
in countries where GDP per capita is lower, there are higher levels of corruption, the tax 
revenue to GDP ratio is lower, the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is lower, 
and the formal rules of the game are incongruent with the norms, values and beliefs of 
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entrepreneurs. Nonregistration at start-up will only reduce if these structural conditions are 
addressed.  
 Nevertheless, even though this paper reveals that the level of nonregistration at start-up 
is significantly correlated with these structural conditions, there are limitations to the 
conclusions that can be drawn, and caveats required. A first limitation of this study is that it 
examines only cross-country variations in the level of nonregistration at start-up of formal 
enterprises that employ five or more employees. It does not examine formal smaller enterprises 
and sole traders that started-up unregistered and neither does it examine unregistered 
enterprises that have not formalised. Secondly, the WBES when measuring whether formal 
enterprises started-up unregistered does not define what is meant by nonregistration. 
Participants may thus interpret nonregistration in different ways (e.g., not having a local trading 
license, not being registered under commercial or IDFWRULHV¶ DFWV not being registered with 
relevant professional associations or regulatory acts). Thirdly, this WBES survey does not 
provide any evaluation of their reasons for being unregistered at start-up (e.g., whether they 
were simply awaiting registration, test-trading to evaluate their YHQWXUH¶V YLDELOLW\ EHIRUH
deciding to register, or whether they had no intention initially of registering) or their reasons 
for registration (e.g., to access formal finance or markets, to win contracts with formal firms, 
to access public sector contracts). And third and finally, only a few structural determinants 
have been here evaluated, particularly in relation to state intervention and institutional 
incongruence. Future surveys should therefore not only examine smaller enterprises that are 
both registered and unregistered, and clarify to survey participants what is meant by being 
registered, but also more qualitative in-depth research is required of the reasons for being 
unregistered and for registering, and there is a need to evaluate in finer-grained detail the state 
interventions leading to reduced levels of nonregistration (e.g., active labour market policies, 
social protection expenditure, educational provision). This would enable governments to better 
tailor the policy initiatives required to reduce nonregistration at start-up.   
 In sum, if this paper thus stimulates further entrepreneurship research that further 
advances the finding that cross-national variations in nonregistration at start-up require a 
synthesis of the modernisation, political economy and institutionalist theories, by conducting 
further research as suggested above, then one of its intentions will have been fulfilled. If this 
then results in governments pursuing the prevention of nonregistration by tackling its structural 
determinants, rather than simply curing the problem once it has happened, then the wider 
intention of this paper will have been fulfilled. What is certain, however, is that this paper 
provides no support for the view that decreasing taxation and reducing state intervention will 
reduce the proportion of enterprises starting-up unregistered.  
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Table 1. Nonregistration at start-up, by global region, 2006-2014 
Region % of formal enterprises that started-up unregistered 
South Asia  46.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  43.2 
Middle East & North Africa  21.2 
East Asia and Pacific 17.1 
Latin American & Caribbean  10.2 
OECD 7.9 
Europe and Central Asia 5.5 
All  19.9 
SourceDXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVIURP:RUOG%DQN(QWHUSULVH6XUYH\(WBES) dataset 
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Table 2. Probit regression model of the likelihood of starting up unregistered 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
GDP per capita  -0.118*** (0.009)    
Corruption   0.067*** (0.016)   
([SHQVHRIJRY¶WDV*'3    -0.005*** (0.002)  
Tax revenue to GDP ratio     -0.007*** (0.002) 
Trust  -0.063*** (0.015) -0.052*** (0.016) -0.052*** (0.016) -0.071*** (0.022) -0.032 (0.023) 
Firm age 0.012*** (0.000) 0.013*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.000) 0.012*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) 
Exporter  -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
Foreign ownership -0.193*** (0.031) -0.224*** (0.031) -0.192*** (0.031) -0.248*** (0.043) -0.174*** (0.043) 
Top manager experience 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Temporary worker 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 
Permanent full-time worker -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Female full-time worker  -0.001** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Female ownership share 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
Quality certification  -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
External auditor -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000* (0.000) 
Website  -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
E-mail -0.003*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 
Medium  -0.040** (0.018) -0.056*** (0.018) -0.041** (0.018) -0.034 (0.025) -0.045* (0.026) 
Large  -0.053* (0.031) -0.077** (0.031) -0.052* (0.031) -0.057 (0.045) -0.101** (0.046) 
Closed shareholding -0.259*** (0.034) -0.236*** (0.034) -0.259*** (0.034) -0.326*** (0.045) -0.302*** (0.046) 
Sole proprietor  0.183***(0.035) 0.156*** (0.035) 0.183*** (0.035) 0.014 (0.048) 0.079 (0.049) 
Partnership  0.061 (0.042) 0.028 (0.043) 0.061 (0.042) -0.051 (0.062) 0.015 (0.061) 
Limited partnership  0.022 (0.042) -0.030 (0.042) 0.025 (0.042) -0.146** (0.069) -0.067 (0.069) 
Other legal status  -0.042 (0.060) -0.032 (0.060) -0.040 (0.060) -0.045 (0.080) -0.022 (0.081) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -1.359*** (0.055) -0.393*** (0.093) -1.396*** (0.055) -1.245*** (0.084) -1.212*** (0.083) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
N 67,515 66,588 67,515 36,162 32,393 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SourceDXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVIURP:RUOG%DQN(QWHUSULVH6XUYH\:%(6GDWDVHW 
 
